Labor Law -- Unions -- Political Campaign Contributions -- United States v. Pipefitters Local 562 by Griffin Jr, Daniel J
Boston College Law Review
Volume 13
Issue 6 Number 6 Article 10
6-1-1972
Labor Law -- Unions -- Political Campaign
Contributions -- United States v. Pipefitters Local
562
Daniel J. Griffin Jr
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Election Law Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law Commons
This Casenotes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Daniel J. Griffin Jr, Labor Law -- Unions -- Political Campaign Contributions -- United States v. Pipefitters
Local 562, 13 B.C.L. Rev. 1532 (1972), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol13/iss6/10
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
Ratner, then, has interpreted Section 127(b) (6) of the Consumer
Credit Protection Act as being "pros'pective" in scope and requiring
as least a nominal annual percentage rate disclosure on the monthly
billing statement to an obligor in an open end credit transaction, even
if the obligor has not incurred a finance charge. This required disclosure
will effectively assist the consumer to compare credit costs, and enable
him to determine which creditor offers the best deal. In addition, the
court determined that since the paramount purpose of the Consumer
Credit Protection Act is to provide consumer protection, only clerical
errors are sufficient to exempt creditors from the Act's civil proscriptions
and that, accordingly, even "reasonable" mistakes are violations of the
Act. The import of this conclusion is that the creditor will not be able
to experiment with obligors' rights under the Act, and see how far the
language can be stretched. Finally, by denying plaintiff class recovery
the court concluded that class actions might not always be proper under
the Act.
CHARLES J. HANSEN
Labor Law—Unions—Political Campaign Contributions—United
States v. Pipefitters Local 562.'—In 1949, Local No. 562 of the Pipe-
fitters Union established the Pipefitters Voluntary Political, Educa-
tional, Legislative, Charity and Defense Fund (Fund). Until the end
of 1962, the Fund was maintained solely by the assessments of mem-
bers of Local 562 and members of other unions working within Local
562's jurisdiction. The assessments were in addition to the union dues.
During this time each union member was assessed a specified amount
for each eight hour work day. These assessments were collected directly
creditor's fiscal year immediately preceding the fiscal year in which the
failure occurred; and
(3) in the case of any successful action to enforce the foregoing
liability, the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney's fee
which shall be the reasonable value of the services rendered by the attorney
without regard to the amount of any recovery.
In determining the amount of punitive damages in any class action, the court
shall consider, among other relevant factors, the amount of any actual damages
awarded, the frequency and persistence of failures of compliance by the creditor,
the resources of the creditor, the number of persons adversely affected, and the
extent to which the creditor's failure of compliance was intentional.
S. 652, if 208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). Senator Proxmire has called S. 652 the "'Bank
Protection Act of 1972.'" S. Rep. No. 92-750, 92d Cong., 2d Sem 22 (1972). As to the
class action provision, Senator Proxmire states that the amendment would weaken the
Consumer Credit Protection Act's civil liability provisions and concludes that the
"maximum liability figure should be substantially raised in order to provide a meaningful
compliance by large creditors." Id. at 33.
1 434 F.2d 1116 (8th Cir. 1970), aff'd on rehearing, 434 F.2d 1127 (8th Cir. 1970),
cert. granted, 402 U.S. 994 (1971). The case was argued before the Supreme Court in
January, 1972.
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from union members by union stewards, or paid directly by the mem-
bers to Local 562's headquarters. In 1963, Local 562 abandoned this
assessment procedure2 and substituted a system of voluntary contribu-
tions. The signatures of members and non-members working on Local
562 projects were obtained on voluntary contribution cards,' under
which members and non-members pledged a specific amount per eight
hour work day, with all contributions being used to finance the Fund.
The contributions to the Fund were usually collected by the foreman
at the job site who maintained collection sheets with the names of the
employees, the hours worked, and the amount paid to the Fund. These
collections were retained in a separate bank account of the Fund, and
were not commingled with the union's general treasury funds or with
the dues paid by union members.4
In 1968, the union and three of its officers were indicated for con-
spiring to violate Section 610 of Title 18 of the United States Code 5
during the 1963-1968 period. Section '610 prohibits labor organizations
from making contributions or expenditures iii connection with any po-
litical campaign for President, Vice President, Senator or Representa-
tive.° Each was found guilty by the jury in the United States District
2 Prior to 1963, the union had financed both the Fund and the general union
treasury through this assessment procedure. In 1963, the union instituted a check off
system for collecting from Local 562 members the mandatory payments to the general
treasury, in addition to initiating the voluntary contribution system for financing the
Fund.
8 The voluntary contribution card read as follows:
I the undersigned, .of my own free will and accord, desire to make regular
contributions to the Political, Education, Legislative, Charity and Defense
Fund which has been established and will be maintained by persons who are
members of Local Union No. 562.
I therefore, agree to hereafter contribute . . . % per eight hour day to
said fund and authorize my contributions to be used and expended by those in
charge of the fund, in their sole judgement and discretion, for political, educa-
tional, legislative, charity and defense purposes.
I understand that .contributions are voluntary on my part and that I may
revoke this agreement by a written notice to that effect mailed to the fund or
to persons in charge thereof. I also understand that my contributions are no
part of the dues or financial obligations of Local Union 562 and that the union
has nothing whatsoever to do with this fund.
Brief for Appellants at 20, United States v. Pipefitters Local 562 (8th Cir. 1970).
4 The contributions to the Fund by the members of Local 562 and members of the
other unions aggregated $1,230,968 during the indictment period (1963-68). Disbursements
out of the Fund for contributions to candidates for federal offices aggregated $151,412.
6 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970). The defendant-appellants were indicted under the conspiracy
section of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1970).
6 Section 610 to the extent here pertinent provides:
It is unlawful for any . . labor organization to make a, contribution or
expenditure in connection with any election at which Presidential and Vice
Presidential electors or a Senator or Representative in, or a Delegate or Resident
Commissioner to Congress are to be voted for, or in connection with any primary
election or political convention or caucus held to select candidates for any of the
foregoing offices. ...
For the purposes of this section "labor organization" means any organization
of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in
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Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. The union was fined five
thousand dollars and the three officers of Local 562 were each sentenced
to a one year imprisonment and fined one thousand dollars.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the de-
fendant-appellants argued that the Fund was not a fund of Pipefitters
Local Union No. 562; rather, it was an entity separate and apart from
the union, and therefore not a "labor organization" as - required by sec-
tion 610. The appellants' contention was based primarily on the asser-
tion that the Fund was financed totally through voluntary contributions.
Furthermore, they argued that if in fact section 610 were applicable to
the Fund, then the statute unconstitutionally abridged the individual
union members' freedom of association? The Government contended
that the political expenditures came from union funds because the con-
tributions were not voluntary, but were collected as part of the union's
mandatory dues. The Fund, it argued, was merely a device established
by the appellants to give the appearance of an entity separate from a
"labor organization." The Government concluded that the application
of section 610 by the district court to this factual situation was not an
unconstitutional abridgement of the union members' right of associa-
tion, because contributions to separate voluntary political associations
by union members were not proscribed by the interpretation given the
statute. In a majority opinion affirming the convictions, the court
HELD: that the controlling issue in determining a violation of section
610 was whether or not the Fund from which political contributions
were made was a union fund and not whether or not the Fund was sup-
ported by voluntary contributions. In addition, the court held that the
statute, thus construed, did not unconstitutionally infringe upon the
union members' right of association because of the existence of a valid
governmental interest. Any abridgement of the individual union mem-
bers' right of association was outweighed by the compelling govern-
mental interest of protecting those union members who subscribe to
political views contrary to those supported by those in control of the
Fund.
The issue before the court was whether the political expenditures
were made by a "labor organization" under section 610. Specifically,
the court of appeals had to determine whether the presence of volun-
tary contributions precluded characterizing the Fund as a "labor or-
ganization." The court concluded that the factor which distinguished
a section 610 violation was whether or not the money in the Fund in
fact belonged to the labor organization; and that the voluntary or in-
voluntary nature of the payments to the Fund constituted only one of
which employees participate and which exist for the purpose, in whole or in part,
of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates
of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.
7 This note will not consider other issues raised on appeal relating to the vagueness
of the statute, the violation of due process-equal protection, or the right to vote for
Senators and Representatives. These issues were collateral to the essential holding of
Pipefitters.
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many factors "relevant and material on the issue of whether the fund
is the property of Local 562." 8
 Indeed, the court was willing to concede
only that where contributions are voluntarily made to a fund, "[i] f the
voluntary fund is a separate and distinct entity and it made the [cam-
paign] contributions, no violations of section 610 would exist as the
voluntary fund as a separate entity would not constitute a labor orga-
nization."°
In its brief review of the background of section 610, the court of
appeals relied upon Mr. Justice Rutledge's opinion in United States
v. C101° to support by implication its interpretation of the scope of
this section. In that case Mr. Justice Rutledge declared that the three
principal objectives of the statute were: (1) to minimize the undue
influence of labor unions in elections; (2) to preserve the purity of
elections against the use of aggregated wealth by unions; and (3) to
protect those union members who oppose the use of their funds for
candidates they do not support. He emphasized that "the differences
[among the three objectives] as well as their . . . combination become
important for deciding the scope of the section's coverage and its
validity in specific application."" After considering these three objec-
tives, the court in Pipe fitters apparently was satisfied that its inter-
pretation of the scope of section 610 was correct. That is, an entity
had to satisfy two requirements in order to fall outside of the purview
of that provision. It must be separate from the labor organization so
that its existence does not defeat the first two objectives relating to the
influence and wealth of a union entity; and it must be funded by vol-
untary contributions, which fact would negate any need to protect
"minority" union members. Consequently, any fund which was not
separate from the labor organization would necessarily fall within the
coverage of section 610, regardless of the fact that all of the contribu-
tions to the fund might have been voluntary.
This casenote will focus upon the validity of the court's deter-
mination that the true test for a section 610 violation was whether the
fund was an entity separate from the labor organization, rather than
whether the union members bad voluntarily contributed to the fund.
Since reference to the strict language of the statute is inconclusive on
this point, consideration shall be given to the legislative history of the
statute and to the judicial decisions thereunder. The casenote will
attempt to illustrate, first, that historically courts have been unwilling
to apply section 610 where voluntary contributions were the source of
the fund, regardless of the connection between the fund and the union.
Secondly, the note will argue that the intent of Congress, as revealed
by the legislative background of section 610, was to exclude from the
8 434 F.2d at 1120. In stating that there were other considerations involved the
court enumerated only one—the intention of the donors as to ownership and control
of the fund. Id.
9 Id. at 1121.
10 335 U.S. 106 (1948).
11 Id. at 135 (emphasis added).
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scope of the statute those political expenditures attributable to funds
voluntarily contributed. Since Congress recognized that the primary
purpose of regulating union contributions was "minority protection,"
the use of only voluntary contributions would eliminate the necessity of
protecting any minority from coercion to contribute. Finally, the case-
note will examine the constitutionality of section 610 as interpreted
by the court of appeals.
Support f or the proposition that the issue of the "voluntariness"
of the contribution is of primary impcirtance in interpreting section
610 can be found in'the decisions of the few cases brought thereunder.
The Supreme Court's first opportunity to comment upon a case brought
under section 610 arose when it decided United States v. CIO.' In
that case, the CIO News, a union-published periodical financed by
union funds, carried an editorial advocating the election of a certain
candidate for Congress. The union was indicted under Section 313 of
the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, now 18 U.S.C. § 610. The Goirern-
ment argued that, by publishing and distributing the periodical, the
union had made a political "expenditure" proscribed by the Act. The
district court" dismissed the indictment." The district court felt that
Congress could not impinge upon the union' members' freedoms of
press and speech. 15
On direct appeal, the Supreme Court avoided the constitutional '
argument by narrowly construing the word "expenditure" to exclude
expenses for the publication of union material distributed only to
members.'° Justice Reed, summarizing the statute's legislative history,
recognized that Congress sought to deter the union officials from mak-
ing contributions from the general union funds to a political party
which the individual member might oppose." All of the justices rec-
ognized that a "primary purpose" of section 610 was to protect union
members holding political views contrary to those advocated by the
union from having their funds used to promote acceptance of those
opposing views.' Thus, the rationale of this initial case construing
section 610 as applied to unions suggested, by its restricted interpreta-
tion of section 610 and its insistence on looking to the primary legis-
lative intent of the statute, that voluntary contributions by individual
members of the union to a political fund were not intended to be within
the scope of section.610.
The Supreme Court explicitly articulated its earlier indication
that section 610 did not forbid voluntary contributions from members
12 335 U.S. 106 (1948). For a more detailed discussion of this case see Note, 47
Mich. L. Rev. 408 (1949); Note 1949 Wis. L. Rev. 184 (1949).
13 77 F. Supp. 355 (D.D.C. 1948).
14 Id. at 358. The court stated that "no clear and present danger to the public
interest can be found in the circumstances surrounding the enactment of this legislation."
15 Id. at 357.
16 335 U.S. at 123.
17 Id. at 115.
18 Id. at 115, 134, 137.
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of the union in United States v. UAW." In that case, the union had
been indicted under section 610 for using union dues to pay for com-
mercial broadcasts urging the selection of certain candidates for fed-
eral office. The district court, in disMissing the complaint, held that
union-paid broadcasts, were not prohibited by the statute." On appeal,
the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the use of union dues to
sponsor television endorsements of candidates would violate section
610. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the Court, indicated that
in a trial involving a purported section 610 violation, a paramount
question would be whether or not the funds had been obtained on a
voluntary basis," and thereby implied that the appellants could have
escaped the limitations imposed by section 610 if they had collected
the funds through voluntary contributions.
On two occasions the federal district courts have been confronted
with fact situations similar to that in Pipe fitters. In United States v.
Warehouse Local 688,22
 two-thirds, of the members of a union bad
signed cards authorizing the allocation of a specific portion of their
union dues for expenditures to be incurred in connection with federal
elections. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri held that section 610 did not forbid direct contributions or
expenditures by a union in connection with federal elections where
the funds came from that portion of membership dues voluntarily
designated for such political purposes by the individual union mem-
bers.28
 Although a literal interpretation of section 610 would have
prohibited such political contributions by the union, the court was
satisfied that since each member had voluntarily granted permission
to the union to use his dues for political purposes section 610 had not
been violated. The court went on to state that an interpretation of sec-
tion 610 which would prohibit political contributions under the instant
circumstances would be of doubtful constitutional validity. 24
In a similar case involving voluntary contributions, United States
v. Anchorage Central Labor Council,'" a labor council, made up of
twenty-six local labor unions, was indicted under section 610 for mak-
ing an "expenditure" from the general fund of the organization in con-
nection with federal elections. This fUnd was financed by a per capita
tax paid by each union after a vote of .the membership decided whether
or not to contribute and how much the per capita tax would be. In
10 352 U.S. 567 (1957). For a discussion of this case see Note, 46 Geo. L.J. 176
(1957) ; Note, 1957 U. Ill. L.F. 319 (1957).
20 138 F. Supp. 53, 59 (E.D. Mich. 1956).
21 352 U.S. at 592.
22 47 L.R.R.M. 2005 (E.D.Mo. 1960). It is significant that the attorney for the
union in this district court case, Henry Craig Esq., was the same attorney who had advised
Local 562 regarding the collection of funds and the use of voluntary pledge cards. See
Brief for Appellants at 16-17, United States v. Pipefitters Local 562, (8th Cir. 1970).
23 47 L.R,R.M. at 2006-07.
24 Id.
25 193 F. Supp. 504 (D. Alas. 1961).
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granting the defendant's motion for acquittal, the court held that the
expenditures would not be illegal under section 610 unless it could
be shown that contributions were paid out of union dues and were not
the result of voluntary contributions." This holding reemphasized the
suggestion of Justice Frankfurter in UAW that a union can maintain
a political fund provided that the source of that fund is voluntary con-
tributions.
The above decisions indicate not only that the judiciary considered
the concern for "minority protection" as the leading purpose of section
610, but, more importantly, that in determining the existence of a sec-
tion 610 violation, the decisive issue should not be whether the fund
was an independent entity separate from the union, but rather whether
the members in fact voluntarily contributed to the fund.' Where the
source of the funds was uncertain the appellate courts should remand
the case" and allow the trier of fact to determine if the funds came
from involuntary union dues. Only after this critical question was an-
swered would the courts hold that section 610 had been violated. It
must be admitted, however, that this conclusion rests on only a few
decisions.
The paucity of cases under section 610, coupled with the lack of
'a definitive judicial statement on its scope, makes it both appropriate
and essential to examine the legislative history of the statute. The
earliest legislative antecedent of section 610, the Act of January 26,
1907," provided that it was unlawful for any corporation to make a
contribution to an election for federal office. The moving force behind
this legislation was the congressional desire to destroy the influence
of corporations over elections." Furthermore, Congress felt that a cor-
poration had no right to use corporate funds for contributions without
the consent of its stockholders.' Thus, from their' inception, congres-
sional attempts to regulate political contributions were directed toward
protecting the interests of an individual within a larger organization.
Congress sought to minimize the possibility that a stockholder would
be forced to contribute to causes or candidates which he did not sup-
port or to which he did not wish to contribute.
This prohibition against corporate contributions was re-enacted
in the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925 (FCPA). 32 Furthermore,
2° Id. at 507.
27 See Comment, 46 Marg. L. Rev. 364, 370 (1963).
28 352 U.S. at 592-93. Judge Heaney in his dissent in Pipefitters would have granted
the defendants a new trial to determine whether campaign expenditures were made
from funds voluntarily contributed with the knowledge that the contributions were to
be used for political purposes. 434 F.2d at 1126.
28 34 Stat. 864-65 (1907).
8° 40 Cong. Rec. 96 (1906); 41 Cong. Rec. 22 (1907).
al Hearings Before the House Comm. on the Election of the President, 59th Cong., 1st
Sess. 76 (1906); 40 Cong. Rec. 96 (1906).
82 43 Stat. 1070, 1074 (1925), partially included in 18 U.S.C, § 610 (1970).
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pursuant to congressional recognition" that labor unions should come
under the same restrictions regarding contributions to political cam-
paigns as those imposed on corporations, the War Labor Disputes
(Smith-Connally) Act of 1943" brought labor unions within the cover-
age of the FCPA for the duration of World War II. Congress deter-
mined not only that the influence of unions on elections through
monetary expenditures should be minimized, but, more importantly,
that it would be unfair to an individual union member to permit union
leaders to make contributions from the union treasury which the in-
dividual member might oppose." As Representative Halleck stated in
the House debate over the Act of 1943: "If a union member wants to
contribute, he has the same privilege as any other individual. His
money could not be used politically as he would not want it used." 86
Another proponent argued that amending the FCPA to include restric-
tions on unions would protect a union member "by putting safeguards
around the funds that are taken from him as dues." 37 This initial at-
tempt to regulate a union's contributing to political campaigns, then,
was not intended to prevent expenditures for such campaigns by po-
litical organizations whose financial support came from voluntary con-
tributions of union members."
The temporary extension of the FCPA to include lalior unions
was made permanent by Section 304 of the Labor-Management Rela-
tions Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act)." In the debate over its passage,"
both the sponsor of the Act, Senator Taft, and his colleagues agreed
that its coverage depended on the source of the funds which were sub-
sequently expended in making political contributions. Accordingly, the
applicability of section 304, now encoded as 18 U.S.C. § 610, de-
pended upon whether the funds came from the members' mandatory
general dues, or were attributable to voluntary payments by the union
members for political purposes. 41 Senator Taft stated that funds vol-
88 Hearings Before a Suhcomm. of the Comm. on Labor on H. R. 804, and H. R.
1483, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 2,4 (1943) ; S. Rep, No. 101, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1945).
84 57 Stat. 163 (1943), 50 U.S.C. I§ 1501-11 (1946). For a discussion of the history
of unions in politics see Kovarsky, Unions and Federal Elections—A Social and Legal
Analysis, 12 St. Louis U. L.J. 358 (1968) ; Won, Unions in Politics: A Study in Law
and the Workers' Needs, 34 S. Cal. L. Rev. 130 (1961).
85 89 Cong. Rec. 5334, 5792 (1943).
86 Id. at 5334.
37 Id. at 5792 (remarks of Senator Revercomb).
88 Leter from the United States Attorney General to Senator Moore, Sept. 23, 1944,
in Dep't of Justice Press Release, Sept. 25, 1944, excerpted in Department of Justice Clears
P.A.C., 4 Law. Guild Rev. 49 (Sept.-Oct. 1944).
89 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970). See also Comment, Section 304, Taft-Hartley Act: Validity
of Restrictions on Union Political Activity, 57 Yale L.J. 806 (1948) ; Chang, Labor
Political Action and the Taft-Hartley Act, 33 Neb. L. Rev. 554 (1954) ; Kallenbach, The
Taft-Hartley Act and Union Political Contributions and Expenditures, 33 Minn, L. Rev. 1
(1948).
49 93 Cong. Rec. 6436-40 (1947).
41 Id. at 6440, 6448.
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untarily contributed for election purposes might be used without vio-
lating section 610,42
 and that "[a] union can . . . receive direct
contributions, just so long as members of the union know what they
are contributing to, and the dues which they pay into the union trea-
sury are not used for . . . [political] purpose.""
In interpreting Senator Taft's remarks on the scope of section
610, commentators have recognized that whether unions could legally
organize funds for the purpose of contributing to political campaigns
would depend on whether the funds were supported by voluntary con-
tributions, as opposed to union dues." The commentators agreed that
the primary concern of Congress in having section 610 applied to
unions was to protect those union members who found themselves in
the minority on a given political issue within the union from an un-
approved use of their dues." The proscription of the use of union dues
for political contributions is predicated upon the principle that admis- -
sion'to a union should not be qualified by a simultaneous surrender of;
political independence.
This examination of the legislative history of section 610 indicates
that Congress, in passing the existing statute forbidding unions to con-
tribute to political campaigns, strove to protect the individual - union
member from having his mandatory dues used to support political
endeavors which he did not favor. Hence it would appear that the Pipe-fitters decision, that a fund which was not separate from the labor
organization would automatically violate section 610, fails to correlate'
with Congress' emphasis on the primary purpose of protecting minority
union members. This primary purpose ,
 could be realized only by an
examination of the source of the funds. When union members have
voluntarily contributed. to a union fund, knowing their contributions
would be used to support political campaigns, the members' rights
need no protection, for no "minority" exists. In such a case, where
there are only voluntary contributions, the concept of minority pro-
tection should not be relied upon to bring the fund within the pro-
hibitory scope of section 610.
The attempt in Pipe fitters to create a new standard for applica-
tion of section 610 appears'to be unwarranted and impracticable. Pre-
vious judicial reliance on a test looking to the voluntary nature Of the
contributions accords with the prevalent congressional purpose of pro-
tecting minority union members. When measured by that test, the
statute has withstood attacks on its constitutionality. Furthermore, the
acceptance over the years of this "voluntariness" test has furnished
lower courts with guidelines in applying section 610, which guidelines
have rendered.the fact-finder's bUrden somewhat easier. A jury could
42 Id.•at 6440.
42 Id.
" 46 Marg. L. Rev., supra note 27, at 370; Clover, Political Contributions by Labor
Unions, 40 Texas L. Rev. 665, 670 (1962).
45 Clover, supra note 44, at 670; Kallenbach, supra note 39, at 16.
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more readily determine what the term "voluntary" encompassed as
opposed to the undefined term "separate entity." Finally, the unions'
members have themselves relied upon prior decisions to organize funds
which would comply with judicial interpretations of section 610.
Pipefitters overturns this relatively well-established interpretation
of section 610. The "separate and distinct entity" test which it pro-
poses is apparently founded on a literal reading of a requirement in
section 610 that there be a "labor organization." Although the court
failed to establish any criteria with which a fact-finder might identify
such an "entity," it appears that, in fact, many of the criteria con-
sidered under the pre-Pipe fitters test will be retained under the Pipe-
fitters test, such as the relationship between the contributions and the
union dues, the manner of collecting the contributions and the identity
of the officers of the fund. Apart from these criteria, the individual
fact-finder will be free to decide what remaining elements might con-
stitute a "separate" fund. That proposition, however, is undesirable,
not only because the union members are left with no indication of how
they can legally contribute collectively to political candidates, but also
because the coverage of section 610 , thus interpreted may approach
unconstitutional limits. The tenor of this new judicial test is directed
not so much at minority protection as it is at limiting the union's in-
fluence in elections. By instituting this ill-defined test, under which
the courts are given virtually unlimited discretion to determine what
constitutes a "separate entity," the Pipefitters court augmented the
power of the judiciary to control unions' financial support of political
campaigns. Since the Pipefitters test is presented without adequate
guidelines and hence may give rise to problems in judicial administra-
tion, and since the purpose behind that test is constitutionally question-
able, it is submitted that the court should have adopted the pre-
Pipefitters "voluntariness" test."
40 The failure of Pipefitters to clearly delineate permissible union political activity
was instrumental in the formulation of recent legislation. On January 19, 1972 Congress
passed the Federal Election: Campaign Act which amended 18 U.S.C. § 610 to include:
As used in this section, the phrase "contribution or expenditure" . . . shall not
include . . . the establishment, administration and solicitation of contributions
to a separate segregated fund to be utilized for political purposes by a . .
labor organization: provided, That it shall be unlawful for such a fund to make
a contribution or expenditure by utilizing money or anything of value secured by
physical force, job discrimination, financial reprisals, or the threat of force, job
discrimination or financial reprisal; or by dues, fees, or other moneys required
as a condition of membership in a labor organization or as a condition of em-
ployment... .
Title III, § 205, Federal Election Campaign Act, 86 Stat. 3 (Feb. 7, 1972).
This bill emphasizes the significance of the voluntariness of the contributions by
explicitly stating what would constitute an involuntary contribution. The only remnant
of the Pipefitters test incorporated in this bill is the requirement that the contributions
be placed in a separate fund. That requirement is fundamental even under the pre-Pipe-
fitters test, since the fund had to show it was financed by contributions and not union dues.
The amendment's sponsor, Representative Orval Hansen (R., Idaho) stated that the
amendment was not intended to overrule Section 610, but rather merely to clarify it.
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The court's interpretation in Pipe fitters raises serious doubts con-
cerning the constitutionality of section 610. The court upheld the con-
stitutionality of the statute as it interpreted it on the ground that the
"compelling" governmental interest in protecting the individual union
members' right of political expression from subjugation to organiza-
tional control, clearly outweighed the concurrent infringement upon
the union members' right of political expression through association.47
The importance of an individual's right of association has been stressed
repeatedly by the judiciary. The Supreme Court in De Jonge v. Ore-
gon" recognized that the right of individuals to join together volun-
tarily in political organizations is just as fundamental a right as are
freedom of speech and freedom of the press." The De Jonge case
proposed that in order to maintain free political discussion and a
responsive government, and to enable peaceful changes within that
government, freedom of association must come within the purview of
the First Amendment."
This independent right of association was more fully developed
in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson." The Court in that case rec-
ognized that effective advocacy of political ideologies and beliefs was
"undeniably enhanced by group association," and it clearly recognized
the nexus between freedom of speech and freedom of association."
Furthermore, group activity was held to be an indispensable liberty
which was protected by the First Amendment against regulatory as-
saults by the government." In applying this doctrine of freedom of
association to political organizations, the Court in Sweezy v. New
Hampshire" stated that "[o]ur form of government is built on the
premise that every citizen shall have the right to engage in political
expression and association. . . . Exercise of these basic freedoms in
America has traditionally been through the media of political associa-
tions."°
The decision in Pipe fitters directly limits the exercise of this free-
dom. The individual members of Local 562 sought to exercise their
right of political expression and association by combining their volun-
Wall Street Journal, January 20, 1972, at 2, col. 2. Representative Hansen also stated
that this amendment was "consistent with the legislative intent expressed by the original
author of section 610." 118 Cong. Rec. H. 94 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 1972).
47 434 KM at 1123.
48 299 U.S. 353 (1937). See also: Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of
Expression, 74 Yale L.J. 1 (1964); Douglas, The Right of Association, 63 Colum. L.
Rev. 1361 (1963).
40 299 U.S. at 364.
50 Id. at 365.
51 357 U.S. 449 (1958). For a discussion of this case see Comment, State Control
Over Political Organizations: First Amendment Checks on Powers of Regulation, 66
Yale L.J. 545 (1957).
52 357 U.S. at 460.
58 Id.
m 354 U.S. 234 (1957); see also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963);
United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 143-44 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
55 354 U.S. at 250.
1542
CASE NOTES
tary political contributions for the aggregate support of candidates.
The court's application of section 610 to prohibit voluntary political
contributions to a non-separate fund of the union directly interfered
with the union members' exercise of these rights.
However, freedom of association, like all First Amendment rights,
is not an absolute right, and can, in certain instances, be regulated by
the government. Concerning the government's right to regulate or
infringe upon First Amendment rights, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in
his often-cited concurring opinion in Dennis v. United States," pro-
posed that, in determining whether First Amendment rights have been
violated, the court should "weigh the competing [private and public]
interests."" The approach to be taken under this "weighing test" was
originally adopted by the Court in Schneider v. State." The issue in
that case involved the constitutionality of city ordinances prohibiting
the distribution of handbills. Mr. Justice Roberts, speaking for the
Court, stated that a court "must weigh the circumstances and .. .
appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the
regulation of the free enjoyment of the [First Amendment] rights."'"
In Bridges v. California,°° the Court attempted to clarify the Schneider
"weighing test." The Court explicitly held that an interest sufficient
to outweigh any infringement of First Amendment rights must deal
with a substantive evil that is extremely dangerous and extremely
imminent.' It is this "interest" which deals with a substantive evil
that the court of appeals in Pipe fitters sought to characterize as "com-
pelling" in justifying section 610's limitation on the union members'
right of association.'
In analyzing the "weighing test" of the Supreme Court, one com-
mentator has compared it to a pair of scales onto which the court places
two co-ordinate weights.° 3 If the court finds that the valid governmental
interest only incidentally limits the First Amendment rights, then the
"scale" tips in favor of the legality of the given legislation or regula-
56 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
57 Id. at 524-25. For comments on the doctrine of "weighing interests," see Frantz,
The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 Yale L.J. 1424 (1962) ; Fried, Two Concepts
of Interests: Some Reflections on the Supreme ,
 Court's Balancing Test, 76 Harv. L. Rev.
755 (1963) ; Meiklejohn, The Balancing of Self-Preservation Against Political Freedom,
49 Cal. L. Rev, 4 (1961) ; Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes
in the Balance, 50 Cal. L, Rev. 821 (1962) ; Frantz, Is the First Amendment Law?
—A Reply to Professor Mendelson, 51 Cal. L. Rev. 729 (1963).
68 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
68 Id. at 161.
6° 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
61. Id. at 263. See also Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945) ; Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
62 434 F.2d at 1123. The court cited as authority for its use of "compelling" both
the Bridges and Sherbert cases. It should be noted that Bridges utilized the phrase "sub-
stantive evil" without mentioning any "compelling" interest, whereas Sherbert, in
recognizing the necessity of "compelling" interest, equated this with an interest dealing
with "only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests." 374 U.S. at 406.
65 Meiklejohn, supra note 57, at 12.
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tion." No matter how substantial the legitimate public interest is,
however, the legislation or regulation must center on the .abuse and
narrowly seek to prevent it, for the public interests cannot be furthered
by a regulation that broadly stifles First Amendment rights."
If the Pipe fitters court were seeking to protect union minorities
or to eliminate union influence in elections, or to do both, it is sub-
mitted that these goals could not be properly achieved by broadly
prohibiting union members from voluntarily contributing to political
campaigns. That is, such a broad prohibition does not correlate with
the two requirements or limitations within the "weighing test" of
Schneider. The first, as advocated in Bridges, requires a "compelling".
interest which would encompass a substantive evil endangering public
interests; the second requires that the government regulation must
narrowly seek to eliminate or control the evil, minimizing the First
Amendment infringement.
In Pipefitters, the court recognized that section 610 impinged
upon freedom of association and, therefore, it attempted to weigh the
interests involved to determine the validity of the government regula-
tion." The "weight" which the court of appeals saw as tipping the
scale for the validity of section 610 was "minority protection." The
court asserted that the protection of the individual against appropria-
tion of his dues for political causes which he did not support was,.a
valid governmental interest and that section 610 could be applied to
protect this interest without infringing unnecessarily upon any con-
stitutional rights." Yet such an assertion is paradoxical in light of the
court's holding that a determination of whether the minority funds
were voluntarily contributed to Local 562 for use in political campaigns
was not necessary. That is, the court in Pipe fitters sought to meet the
Schneider requirement by placing on the "scale" the valid public in-
terest of minority protection. Such protection of individual union mem-
bers from exploitation also met the Bridges test by dealing with the
"substantive evil." Thus the court of appeals made extensive use of
minority protection; yet it did so without even determining whether
in fact funds of a "minority" had been appropriated for Local 562's
Fund for political campaigns. In short, there is lacking in Pipe fitters
the necessary answer to the paramount question° 8
 of whether Local 562
did in fact utilize funds contributed as dues by individual members
who did not wish that their money be used for political purposes. Ab-
sent this answer, there could not be a finding that the constitutionality
of the Pipe fitters interpretation of section 610 was supported by the
"compelling" interest of minority protection.
04 See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961); Communist Party v. Subversive
Activities Board, 367 U.S. 1 (1961), where the governmental interest was able to tip the
scales against the First Amendment.
65 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 493 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). .
66 434 F.2d at 1122.
ai Id. at 1123.
68 Id. at 1125 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
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This non-existence of a "compelling" interest based on minority
protection did not preclude the court from finding its interpretation of
the statute constitutional on another ground. In order to make such a
finding another "weight" to counterbalance freedom of association was
needed. The secondary purpose of section 610—the prevention of un-
due influence of labor unions in elections"—may be used to provide
such a counterbalance, offsetting the "weight" of the right of union
members to associate and express themselves politically.
The argument that the prevention of undue influence of labor
organizations could serve as this "weight" was considered, and rejected,
in the concurring opinion in United States v. CIO." Mr. Justice Rut-
ledge there asserted that denial of association by section 610 could not
be justified on the grounds that the prohibition was necessary to pre-
vent undue influence by labor groups. 71
 "The expression of bloc [e.g.,
aggregate expenditures by unions] sentiment is and always has been
an integral part of our democratic electoral and legislative processes.
They could hardly go on without it. 772
 This position was re-emphasized
in Mr. Justice Douglas' dissent in United States v. UAW." In asserting
that all the purposes behind the enactment of section 610 would not
act as sufficient "weight" to justify the resulting sacrifice of First
Amendment rights, Mr. Justice Douglas stated that, "First Amend-
ment rights are part of the heritage of all persons and groups in this
country. They are not to be dispensed or withheld merely because we
or the Congress thinks the person or group is worthy or unworthy." 74
In addition to these judicial expressions, the "interest" of preventing
undue influence of unions in elections does not appear to satisfy the
requirement enunciated in Bridges that the regulation must seek to
eliminate or control a substantive evil which is extremely dangerous
to the public. The concurring opinion in C/O and the dissent in UAW
strongly suggest that the requirement of "compelling" interest is not
met by the limited purpose of preventing undue influence of unions in
elections.
Section 610, in light'of the cases, brought thereunder and its legis-
lative history, was apparently misinterpreted in Pipe fitters when the
court insisted that the issue of the "voluntariness" of the contributions
was not controlling. The legislative and judicial authorities support the
proposition that any fund financed entirely by voluntary contributions
is outside the scope of section 610. Furthermore, the court of appeals
created a paradox when it declared that a fund financed through volun-
tary contributions could be within the purview of section 610, and
simultaneously based the statute's constitutionality upon the "corn-
02 Id. at 1119.
7° 335 U.S. 106 (1948).
71
 Id. at 143-49. For a similar opinion see Comment, 57 Yale L.J. 806 supra note 39,
at 827.
72 335 U.S. at 143.
73 352 U.S. 567, 593 (1957).
74 Id. at 597.
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pelling" interest of protecting the union minority from being required
to contribute to causes which they as individuals would not have sup-
ported. There is no valid justification for deterring the union members
from freely associating for the furtherance of expressing their political
preferences. Where the "compelling" interest upon which the regula-
tion is supposedly justified lacks substantial foundation, the constitu-
tionality of section 610 as interpreted and applied in Pipe fitters is
questionable.*
DANIEL J. GRIFFIN JR.
Admiralty—Limitation on Sovereign Immunity—Governmental Li-
ability for Negligent Misrepresentation—De Bardeleben Marine
Corp. v. United States.'—Plaintiff tugboat owner was commissioned
by Coyle Lines on February 8, 1964, to anchor two barges off a Tampa
dock and to retrieve them the next day. In the process of removal, the an-
chor of one of the barges ruptured a submerged natural gas pipeline. The
resulting fire and explosion caused damage to the tugboat and both barges
and inflicted personal injuries on the crew. The presence of the pipeline
was first noted in Weekly Notice to Mariners of March 16, 1963. Its
location was then marked on the Coast and Geodetic Survey Chart
issued September 16, 1963. 2 Notice of issuance of this corrected map
was subsequently published in Weekly Notice to Mariners of October
19, 1963. None of these publications, however, was aboard the tug.
The chart that was aboard, dated December 17, 1962, was officially
stamped "Corrected through Weekly Notice of July 20, 1963." Though
stamped as corrected, this chart did not include the location of the pipe-
line. The tugboat owner brought suits under the Suits in Admiralty Act
(SIA),4 alleging that the issuance of the faulty chart constituted negli-
gent misrepresentation and breach of warranty. In the district court,
both parties were found negligent and the damages were apportioned.'
* Subsequent to submission of this article for publication, Pipefitters was reversed by
the United States Supreme Court. United States v. Pipefitters Local 562, 40 U.S.L.W. 4781
(U.S. June 22, 1972). The Court held, inter alia, that 18 U.S.C. 1 610 does not prohibit
union contributions and expenditures from a political fund financed by voluntary donations
of members. The Court also held that such a fund need not be separate from the union
but must be strictly segregated from the union dues and assessments.
1 No. 29,360 (5th Cir., Sept. 8, 1971).
2 These notices are issued in accordance with 33 C.F.R. 72.01-1 (1971), which states:
"Through the means of Notices to Mariners, the Coast Guard disseminates information
concerning establishments, changes, discontinuances, and certain deficiencies in operation
of aides to navigation maintained by and under the authority of the Commandant."
These regulations, issued pursuant to 33 U.S.C. 883(a)-(d) (1970), authorize the
collection and dissemination of maritime data for the purpose of alerting mariners to new
hazards and changes in the navigable waters of the United States.
a No. 29,360 (5th Cir., Sept. 8, 1971).
4 46 U.S.C. f§ 741-52 (1970).
5 No. 29,360 (5th Cir., Sept. 8, 1971). In applying a comparative theory of tort
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